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1. Imperatives as Clause-Types
Before talking about conditionalized imperatives, I want to ensure a common un-
derstanding of ‘imperative’, namely as a clause type in the sense of Sadock and
Zwicky (1985). That means that for a given language L, imperative will be
taken to denote one of L’s form types at sentence level, namely the one tokens
of which are prototypically used for ORDERs or COMMANDs. As such they are
paralleled by declaratives (used for ASSERTIONs), interrogatives (for information-
seeking QUESTIONs) and for some languages also exclamatives and perhaps more.
A natural choice for explaining this clause type system is to assume that it is
encoded semantically, in the sense that the semantic object assigned to a particular
sentence form determines its prototypical usage. The actual speech act performed
by uttering a token of that type is then determined by the interaction of the semantic
object expressed with the context of utterance. Imperatives are well-known to pose
problems for a semantic treatment because they lack a straightforward link to the
anchors of both static and dynamic semantics, namely the concepts of truth/falsity
and of information growth. In that, they differ from interrogatives that have been
linked quite successfully to both via the concept of answerhood. On the other hand,
the speech act types associated with imperatives vary too widely in order to asso-
ciate them in a straightforward way with a speech act (understood as a semantic
element) or a particular type of update (as it can be proposed in a dynamic frame-
work, cf. e.g. Zarnic 2002, Mastop 2005).
Thisunclearandmostlikelynon-propositionalstatusisofcoursemostprob-
lematicwhenitcomesto(compositional)integrationofimperativesintolargercom-
pounds, something which is very rare indeed. For example, very few languages
allow for imperatives to occur in indirect speech (cf. Schwager 2005b for discus-
sion). One of the very few complex sentence types in which (cross-linguistically)
imperatives occur quite naturally are conditionals:
(1) a. If you see something, say something!
b. Whenever you want a beer, check the fridge ﬁrst!
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 I call these conditionalized imperatives (CIs), and will in the following try to shed
some light on how the imperative and the conditionalization are to interact.
CIs would of course be unproblematic for any theory of imperatives if they
were conﬁned to conditionals that encode a relation between consequent and an-
tecedent at speech act level (in the sense of relevance or factual conditionals).
Therefore, I will ﬁrst show that CIs occur as truly hypothetical conditionals as well.
Next, I will argue that an analysis in terms of hypothetical speech acts (HSA)
does not seem to capture all there is about CIs. I then proceed to propose a modal
operator analysis (MOP) for imperatives which assimilates imperatives to perfor-
mative usages of modal verbs.1 It will be shown that MOP accounts naturally for
the various subtypes of the (problematic) class of hypothetical imperatives (inter-
action with quantiﬁcational adverbials, epistemic and non-epistemic conditionals)
and the absence of counterfactual CIs.
2. The Conditional Landscape
Iatridou (1991) distinguishes three major classes of conditionals: relevance, fac-
tual and hypothetical conditionals. I will ﬁrst show that CIs can be found within
all three of them. In the remainder of the paper I will then focus exclusively on
hypothetical conditionals.
2.1. Relevance Conditionals
Relevance conditionals2 do not express that there is a relation in terms of truth or
probabilities between antecedent and consequent. Rather, the antecedent ﬁlters out
one of the conditions (typically relevance) under which the speech act arising from
an utterance of the consequent in the given context would be appropriate. This
reading is lost if we insert then or only (or in general, if prosodic integration is
forced):
(2) a. If you are thirsty, (#then) there is beer in the fridge.
b. #Only if you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.
Some CIs are clearly relevance conditionals. Consider (3a), which loses its most
natural reading if modiﬁed by then or only (under prosodic integration).
(3) a. If I may be honest, better call Andreas as soon as possible.
b. #If I may be honest, then better call Andreas as soon as possible.
c. #Only if I may be honest, call Andreas as soon as possible.
This is not surprising; imperatives can of course be used to perform speech acts,
and thus come with appropriateness conditions that can need ﬁltering.
1The analysis has been developed and motivated independently from CIs in Schwager (2005b).
2They are sometimes also called biscuit conditionals or speech act conditionals.
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Again, the relation between antecedent and consequent is not one in terms of truth
or probability. Here, the antecedent is presupposed to be true (or presupposed to be
believed by the addressee) and speciﬁes the motivation for performing the speech
act corresponding to the consequent. In these cases, then is acceptable, but modiﬁ-
cation with only is disallowed.
(4) a. If you like him so much, why don’t you help him then?
b. ∗Only if you like him so much, why don’t you help him (then)?
Again, it is not surprising that, alongside interrogatives, imperatives occur as con-
sequents of factual conditionals:
(5) a. If you like him so much, then go ahead and help him!
b. ∗Only if you like him so much, then go ahead and help him!
2.3. Hypothetical Conditionals
The only class of conditionals whose manifestation as CIs might be surprising are
hypothetical conditionals. These are usually taken to express that the truth (or
the probability) of the consequent depends on the truth (or the probability) of the
antecedent. The antecedent (at least with indicative conditionals) is presented as
something the truth of which is not known to the speaker.
In (2) and (4) we have seen that hypotheticality is enforced by inserting
then or only. Moreover, only hypothetical conditionals allow for binding from the
consequent into the antecedent:
(6) a. If you really like iti, a donkeyj will be grateful. oki = j
b. If I may tell you something about its healthi, let a donkeyj rest every now
and then. #i = j
c. If you have iti, why don’t you keep a donkeyj in your garden? #i = j
The examples in (7) allow for binding and prosodicintegration, which warrants that
CIs can constitute hypothetical conditionals.
(7) a. If iti is tired, let a donkeyj rest.
b. Call a doctor only if you are sick.
Hypothetical CIs are the only class that is truly interesting for the semantics of im-
peratives, in that the correlation between antecedent and consequent seems to exist
at sub-speech act level and hence forces us to ask how if-clause and imperative are
to interact. Propositional as well as non-propositional analyses rely on the fact that
both parts are propositional. For propositional analyses (in terms of material im-
plication, strict implication or variably strict implication) this is quite obvious, but
also probabilistic accounts relate probabilities of antecedent and consequent propo-
sitions (cf. Ramsey 1929, recently Kaufmann 2005). We may therefore conclude
that standard treatments do not automatically carry over to CIs.
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A common way to think of hypothetical CIs is to treat them as imperatives depend-
ing on whether a certain condition holds (Segerberg 1990, Zarnic 2002, Asher and
Lascarides 2003, Mastop 2005). I have lumped such approaches together under the
label of hypothetical speech act analysis (HSA).3 Taking ! to turn a proposition y
of the form you do P into whatever semantic object corresponds to an imperative,
we can represent HSA schematically as in (8):
(8) f ֌ !y.
According to (8), the effect corresponding to the imperative only has an impact
at a point of evaluation where the antecedent is true (or constitutes a successful
update). Depending on the interpretation of ֌, we can distinguish between analy-
ses that leave the information state unchanged in case the antecedent is not true at
the point of evaluation (cf. Segerberg 1990; Zarnic 2002’s ﬁrst version) and those
that amount to a disjunctive update if the information state does not decide the an-
tecedent (keeping both worlds where f is true and y is commanded and worlds
where f is not true and both y and ¬y remain permitted; cf. Zarnic 2002).4
What all of these analyses have in common is that they treat the imperative
effect as dependent on the antecedent, consequently, the complex sentence is not an
imperative. On the one hand, this is in contrast to the insight gained in syntax that
the clause type of hypothetical conditionals is determined by the clause type of the
matrix clause (cf. Bhatt and Pancheva 2006). On the other hand, even if ultimately
the predictions depend on how ֌ and ! are understood precisely, the following
phenomena appear problematic for HSA. So far, they have not been addressed ex-
plicitly within HSA, and as far as I can tell, they suggest different scopal relations
or simply a tighter interaction between antecedent and consequent.
Intuitively, hypothetical conditionals themselves are a pretty inhomogenous
class, consider the paradigm in (9). Both (9a) and (9b) are naturally understood to
talk about a particular situation, (9c) talks about all relevant situations.
(9) a. If it starts raining, take the bus.
b. If it is raining, take the bus.
c. If it rains, always take the bus.
The various versions of HSA proposed so far (implicitly) focus on cases like (9b).
Covering all cases is not straight-forward. At least for quantiﬁcational adverbials
like(9c), it is easy to see that a naiveextensionof HSA makes unwanted predictions
3This shouldnotmeanthat theyassume thatdependingonthe antecedent,a speechact is fulﬁlled
or not, in the sense that e.g. falsifying the antecedent would exempt the speaker from having made
any (relevant) action. The theories I have been looking at in more detail are all concerned with a
hypothetical imperative effect, independently of what speach act is to be assigned to the complex
sentence.
4Asher andLascarides(2003)achievea similar effect: ¬f-worldsare kept, f worldsarechanged
to y-worlds, leaving us with an information state that veriﬁes ¬f ∨y. Cf. Schwager (2005b) for a
critique of the unconstrained change to y-worlds and the ultimately purely epistemic impact.
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adverbialssuchas never.5 Thepreferred readingfor(10a)makesit comeoutsimilar
to (10b): the imperative has to take scope over the negation and expresses a rule
holding in general, not just for a particular occasion; consequently, what we want is
something along the lines of (11a). HSA allows us to predict (11b) or maybe (11c)
- the former is a possible reading different from (10b), (11c) is unavailable.6
(10) a. If your boss comes in never stare at him!
b. Whenever your boss comes in don’t stare at him!
(11) a. !¬(∃t)[your boss comes in at t][you stare at him at t]
b. your boss comes in at t ֌ !¬(∃t′)[t′ ⊆t][you stare at him at t′]
c. ∗¬(∃t)[your boss comes in at t & !(you stare at him at t)]
HSA fails to predict the correct interaction with adverbially quantiﬁed CIs.
Furthermore, consider Hare (1971)’s contrast between anankastic and other
conditionals as given in (12).
(12) a. If you want sugar in your coffee, you should call the waiter!
b. If you want sugar in your soup, you should get tested for diabetes!
While (12a) expresses that calling the waiter is a means to achieve your goal, (12b)
expresses that the addressee’s wish is a symptom for a certain necessity. CIs repli-
cate the contrast:
(13) a. If you want sugar in your coffee, call the waiter!
b. If you want sugar in your soup, get tested for diabetes!
Again, I doubt that a uniform treatment in terms of (8) can capture the difference
between the two dependencies.
Moreover, CIs replicate a difference in the possibility of binding from the
consequentintotheantecedentthathasbeenobservedtodistinguishdifferentclasses
of hypothetical conditionals. In Section 5, the contrast in (3) will be treated as ev-
idence in favour of a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic instances of
CIs.
5Theargumentonlyholdsforapproachesthatfocusonthenon-epistemicnatureoftheimperative
(cf. Zarnic 2002, Portner 2005, Mastop 2005). Asher and Lascarides (2003)’s analysis does not run
into the problem since it forces the information state into one where all worlds are such that at no
moment the boss comes in you stare at him, which is indeed what we want. I am indebted to one of
my reviewers for pointing this out.
6We might considerturning(11b)into the right readingby addinga covertalways. I am indebted
to Ede Zimmermann for drawing my attention to non-distributive predicates that clearly show that
this is not the right way to go.
(i) a. If your boss comes in, never wink less than three times.
b. alwayst [y. b. comes in at t] ![¬(∃t′)[t′ ⊆t][there are less than 3 winking events in t′]]
Intuitively, (ia) is satisﬁable, but (ib) is not: for no interval of more than three winking events is it
the case that every subinterval also contains three winking events.
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with courtesy.
b. ∗If hei is already there, give every speakeri his badge.
For ordinary conditionals, most of the contrasts mentioned above have been ana-
lyzed as dependent on the modality present in the matrix clause of the conditional.
In the next section, I will propose an analysis for imperatives that assimilates them
to modal verbs and thus allows for a construal of CIs alternative to HSA.
4. Imperatives, Modal Operators, and Conditionals
4.1. Imperatives as Modal Operators (MOP)
4.1.1. Descriptive and Performative Modal Verbs
Imperatives prove problematic for semantics for two reasons: they lack an obvious
connection to truth values (cf. 15), yet at the same time, their effects are too man-
ifold to associate them directly with a particular speech act (e.g. by letting them
constrain the set of deontically accessible worlds), cf. (16):
(15) A: Close the door!
B: #That’s true.
(16) a. Get well soon! WISH
b. Take a cookie if you want. PERMISSION
c. Close that door immediately! ORDER
d.From Shibuya, take the Inokashira line to Komaba Todaimae. ADVICE
I want to suggest comparison with modal verbs as a natural starting point. They
allow for descriptive usages, on which they describe the way the world is with
respect to certain obligations, needs, etc. (e.g. 17b). On the other hand, we ﬁnd
modal verbs in context where they seem to themselves bring about the correspond-
ing modal facts (called performative usages; e.g. 17a).
(17) a. You may pay for this. (supervisor to student in the cafeteria)
b. You may use a credit card. (They accept all major types.)
I follow Kamp (1978) and Schulz (2003) in assuming that descriptive and perfor-
mative modal verbs share the same (propositional) semantics. The difference will
be argued to fall out from a particular setting of contextual parameters.
Now, I want to argue that imperatives are like performative usages of modal
verbs; that is, the same semantic object underlies (18a) and (18b).
(18) a. You must close the door immediately!
b. Close the door immediately!
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comes with presuppositions that constrain it to contexts in which a modal verb like
must would be used performatively.
For the semantics of the modal operator, I follow the standard possible
worlds semantics as laid out in Kratzer (1991).7 Modal verbs express necessity
or possibility of a proposition with respect to two parameters, namely a modal base
f and an ordering source g. Both are functions from worlds into sets of proposi-
tions (conversational backgrounds).8 The former assigns each world w a set of
worlds to be taken into consideration, and the latter assigns each world w a set of
propositionsthat are used to inducean orderingrelation on a set of possibleworlds.
(19) preorder ≤ g(w):
v ≤ g(w) z iff {p ∈ g(w) | z ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ g(w) | v ∈ p}
We can now deﬁne the set of worlds in the background given by f that are optimal
according to the ordering source g at w.9
(20) O(f,g,w) = {v ∈ ∩f(w) | ∀z ∈ ∩f(w): if z ≤ g(w)v then v ≤ g(w)z}
The semantics of the modal verbs must and may can now be given as in (21).10
(21) a. [[ must ]]c,s = l flglplw.(∀w′ ∈ O(f,g,w))[p(w′)]
b. [[ may ]]c,s = l flglplw.(∃w′ ∈ O(f,g,w))[p(w′)]
The various ‘readings’ for modal verbs (e.g. epistemic, deontic, buletic, ...) de-
pend on the particular interpretation of modal base and ordering source. Now, the
performative effect arises only if the parameters involved are such that the speaker
is known to have perfect knowledge about them. Consequently, she utters a ne-
cessity proposition she cannot be mistaken about. Moreover, the ordering source
has to be constituted by some sort of preferences. Then, roughly, if nothing speaks
against her utterance constituting a speech act that makes the necessity (or possibil-
ity) proposition expressed true (e.g. that she is giving a COMMAND - to be deﬁned
as rendering something obligatory which was not obligatory before), her utterance
is taken as a performance of that speech act.
4.1.2. Integrating Imperatives
If we set aside for a moment permission imperatives, we can generalize the con-
tribution of an imperative to saying that among all the ways the speech situation
7Based on Lewis (1973) and Kratzer (1978); cf. van Fraassen (1973) for similar ideas.
8I slightly deviate from the original account in that modal base and ordering source are repre-
sented by free variables in the object language (‘pronouns’, interpreted via assignment s). They
constitute arguments of the modal operator (cf. von Stechow 2004, von Fintel and Iatridou 2005).
9The formula is simpliﬁed relying on Lewis (1973)’s Limit Assumption, which ensures that there
is a well-deﬁned set of optimal worlds.
10Interpretation proceeds via a standard interpretation function [[ ]]c,s, which assigns each expres-
sion its meaning at a context c (specifying a triple of speaker cS, utterance time cT, and utterance
world cW) w.r.t. an assignment s.
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the complement proposition true. This accounts naturally for WISHES that order
with respect to what the speaker wants, COMMANDS (w.r.t. what the speaker com-
mands), ADVICE (w.r.t. the hearer’s preferences), etc.
To spell it out, I assume that imperatives contain a modal operator OPImp,
which is interpreted as a slightly more restricted version of must. Normally, it
expresses necessity with respect to the Common Ground as the modal base (conse-
quently, the modal base is ﬁxed lexically and f is the empty conversational back-
ground e (for any world w, e(w) = / 0). f adduces additional information only in the
case of ADVICE.11 Furthermore, we need a contextually given set of preferences as
an ordering source g. (I use cgc for the function that maps any world to the set of
propositions that are mutual joint belief in c and thus describe the Common Ground
in c; ⋒ is pointwise union of two conversational backgrounds.)12
(22) [[ OPImp ]]c,s = l flglplw.(∀w′ ∈ O(cgc⋒ f,g,w))[p(w′)]
According to (22) an imperative f! could in principle express any proposition that
f is necessary in those worlds held possible by speaker and addressee that come
closest to some contextually given ideal. In order to constrain this to the usages
we actually ﬁnd, we postulate an additional presuppositional meaning component.
Descriptive usages are excluded by the following three requirements that constrain
the interpretation of the free variables f and g:
First, we require that the speaker is an authority on all parameters involved.
This is spelt out in terms of exhaustive knowledge ` a la Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1984) (cf. Zimmermann 2000; BelcS(w) is the set of worlds compatible with what
the speaker believes in w.)
(23) The speaker cS is an authority on a conversational background f in c iff
f ∈ AUTH(cS)(c), where AUTH(cS)(c) = {f :W → POW(POW(W)) |
(∀w ∈ CGc)(∀p)[p ∈ f(w) ↔ (∀w′ ∈ BelcS(w))[p ∈ f(w′)]]}.
Of course, cgc is in AUTH(cS)(c) for any context c (the empty conversational back-
ground e likewise), so we only need to require that g and an eventual non-empty f
(for ADVICE) are in AUTH(cS)(c).
11Consider a scenario as in (i):
(i) A: How do I get to Shibuya?
B: Take the Inokashira Line.
This might have a reading where indeed both speaker and hearer have perfect knowledge about (the
relevant part of) transportation in Tokyo, and the information given consists only in what kind of
preferences to apply (e.g. if saving money or saving time is more important). But it is a lot more
natural in a scenario where speaker and hearer agree on what the common preferences are, and the
speaker is thus giving information as to what option meets them best. Consequently, she is bringing
in additional facts that restrict CGc. Again, in order for the imperative to be acceptable, the speaker
has to be an authority over these facts.
12For each c, cgc is that function from W to POW(POW(W)), s.t. for all w in CGc:
T
cgc(w) =
CGc.
For all f, f′, functionsW → POW(POW(W)), and w ∈W: (f ⋒ f′)(w) ↔ (f(w)∪ f′(w)).
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to rule out ordering sources like what the speaker takes to be most plausible, etc.
Third, the speaker has to afﬁrm the ordering source in c as a good maxim
for acting in the given scenario.13
The proposition expressed by an imperative f! thus amounts to saying that
the worlds in CG that are best according to some contextually given preference
are f-worlds, where the speaker has perfect knowledge of these preferences and
considers them a good guideline for acting in the given scenario.
As it stands, the theory does not explain PERMISSION-readings (cf. 16b).
Giving a permission with an imperative requires overt modiﬁcation (modal parti-
cles, reduced if you like-antecedents). Consequently, I think an analysis should
treat them as somehow marked. In Schwager (2005c) I have proposed to derive
them indirectly via pragmatic reasoning from According to your wish to do f and
not do anything I don’t allow you, it’s best that you do f.14
4.2. Conditionals
Conditionals can now be analyzed by letting if-clauses constrain the modal base of
a modal operator to those worlds that make the antecedent true (cf. Lewis 1973,
Kratzer 1978). They are thus analyzed as in (24).
(24) [[ [ If f, [MOP f g] y ]]]c,s = [[ [ [MOP f+ g] y ]]]c,s ,
where f+ = lw.f(w)∪ {[[ f ]]c,s }.
Conditionals that lack an overt modal operator are assumed to host a covert must of
epistemic necessity.
13It is not clear to me, how this requirement can be made precise. It is needed to account for the
deontic variant of Moore’s paradox (cf. Frank 1996). Take g = the preferences of my tourist guide.
Without the requirement of speaker afﬁrmation, (ia) should be just as good as (ib).
(i) a. (According to my tourist guide) Go to Kyoto! #But I don’t think you should do it.
b. #(According to my tourist guide) you should go to Kyoto. But I don’t think you should
really do it.
In (ib) should has a preference for the speaker centered (and thus afﬁrmed orderingsource) underly-
ing the second sentence as well, thus causing a contradiction. But this can be overcomeby explicitly
adding the different conversational background as constituted by the tourist guide. In contrast to
that, the restriction to a speaker afﬁrmed ordering source cannot be overridden for the imperative.
Note, that the orderingsourceitself need not correspondto the speaker’s preferences: In some cases,
the interests lie clearly on the side of the hearer, as in advices, cf. (ii). The common core is thus that
the speaker thinks that the preferences under consideration are a justiﬁed maxim for acting.
(ii) If you want to go to Harlem, take the A train. (It meets all your requirements of not spending
too much, not losing too much time, etc. #Yet I don’t think that these are the right criteria.)
14Alternatively, one could assimilate PERMISSION-imperatives to a certain case of ADVICE-
imperatives with for example. In Schwager (2005a), these have led me to argue that the neces-
sity operator found in imperatives is complex and consists in exhaustiﬁed possibility (cf. Schwager
2005a), a complication otherwise irrelevant for the present task.
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of CIs fully parallel to that of conditionals with modal verbs. OPImp is the modal
operator in (25b), just as must is in (25a).
(25) a. If you see Jessica at the conference dinner, you must say hi.
b. If you see Jessica at the conference dinner, say hi!
Accordingly, CIs come out as complex imperatives. I call this particular analysis
for CIs obtained from assuming that the imperative is a modal operator MOPCI.
In (26), (25b) is interpreted to be true at a world w if the addressee says hi at the
preferred worlds in CGc where the addressee sees Jessica at the conference dinner.
(26) [[ [ if [you see Jessica at the c.d.][ OPImp f g [you say hi] ]] ]]c,s =
lw.(∀w′ ∈ O(cgc ⋒ lw.{you see Jessica at the c.d.},g,w))
[you say hi(w′)]
Hence, an utterance of (25b) in the given context constrains the Common Ground
by leaving in only worlds where the speaker has the respective preferences (e.g.
worlds w, s.t. g(w) = {whenever you meet a colleague I like under appropriate
circumstances for greeting, you say hi}. This rules out worlds in which Jessica is
not a colleague I like or greeting is inappropriate at conference dinners.)
Turning CIs into complex imperatives differs crucially from all kinds of
hypothetical speech act analyses. Consequently, it is time to take a look at the
prediction it makes with respect to the potential problems individuated for HSA.
Assimilatingimperativesto modals makes manyanalyses proposed recently
for anankastic conditionals carry over immediately to CIs (e.g. Sæbø 2002, Huitink
2005).15 Quantiﬁcational adverbials can be integrated easily if we allow for the
imperative operator to take widest scope and follow Lewis (1975) in letting the if-
clause restrict the quantiﬁcational adverbial. (10a) (repeated as 27a) is correctly
predicted to come out as (10b).
(27) a. If your boss comes in, never stare at him.
b. [[ OPImp f g [never [if your boss comes in][you stare at him]] ]]c,s =
lw.(∀w′ ∈ O(cgc⋒ f,g,w))[¬(∃t)[your boss comes in at t in w′ &
you stare at him at t in w′ ]],
where g = what the speaker commands, f empty
HSA and MOPCI differ further in that the latter but not the former predicts that
deliberately falsifying the antecedent should be a means of complying with a CI.
An anonymous referee has suggested this as as evidence against MOPCI. I do not
think that this is correct. For some examples it is completely natural to leave it to
the addressee to either block the antecedent or satisfy the consequent, cf. (28).16
15The most recent analysis of von Fintel and Iatridou (2005) assumes a nested construal. If the
nearness modality they are employing can be made compatible with my analysis, it requires the
extension in Section 5. But one should pay attention to the fact that, in contrast to the nested cases
considered so far, anankastic conditionals do not block binding relations; cf. e.g. (14a).
16Piwek (2001) expresses a similar view in a planning-based framework for imperatives. He
argues that avoiding the antecedent is a strategy only if the consequent conﬂicts with further com-
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don’t mention I was in Frankfurt last week.
b. If you get a bad mark, don’t ever come back here!
c. Don’t risk your life when driving. If you are tired, stop and have a nap.
The intuitive asymmetry between the two options of complying with a CI should
perhaps be seen in light of the well-known tendency of antecedents to be topical.
5. Nested Modality
So far, we have assumed that an overt modal operator in the consequent would al-
ways act as the conditional operator. But Kratzer’s framework acknowledges also
an alternative construal under which the overt modality is treated as a fact in the
world that depends on the antecedent. In that case, the role of the conditional oper-
ator is left to a covert element of epistemic necessity. von Fintel and Iatridou (2005)
discuss the following example:
(29) a. Ifjaywalkingisillegalinthistown, thatguyovertherehas tobepunished.
b.   fcirc [jaywalking is illegal] gcS−wishes [that guy over there is punished]
c.   fepi [jaywalking is illegal] [ law that guy over there is punished ]
The construal in (29b) is the one we have been considering so far. Here, has to,
plays the role of the conditional operator, interpreted perhaps to be circumstantial.
This reading is true of a scenario where the speaker does not know if jaywalking is
illegal, but thinks it should not be. He is convinced that, if it was illegal, the guy he
is pointing at (some hard-core lobbyist of the automobile industry) was responsible
and thus deserved punishment. The construal in (29c) makes use of the alternative
we have just introduced. Again the speaker does not know if jaywalking is illegal,
but in case it is, this would mean that the law is such that it requires punishment for
the guy he is pointing at and who is obviously jaywalking.
At this point we have to ask ourselves if CIs ever constitute cases of nested
modality. That is, can we observe a difference between CIs that depend on overall
preferences and CIs with antecedent-based preferences? At ﬁrst glance, a nested
reading might be unexpected, since imperatives cannot normally be embedded un-
der modal operators.17 Nevertheless, I will show that some CIs appear to involve
nested modality. The MOP-analysis for imperatives will extend naturally to these
mitments of the addressee. Thus switching from mere (dis-)obedience to reasons for action seems
promising,also with respectto the discussionin Dummett(1964). I thinkthatthe addresseecentered
view should be replaced by one in terms of mutual joint belief though. This comes natural in my
analysis for imperatives.
17Cases like German (i) might seem to contradict that.
(i) Ruf
call.IMP
ihn
him
vielleicht
maybe
mal
Q-PARTICLE
an.
up
‘Maybe, you better call him.’
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Ground that has been made salient in the context. But before we start investigating
CIs, it might be useful to take a look at general evidence for nested construals.
5.1. CIs and Epistemicity
Covert modal operators giving rise to nested modality as in (29c) are generally
assumed to encode epistemic necessity. Consequently, we obtain epistemic con-
ditionals. These draw on an uncertainty as to what is the case (and thus could be
known in principle), in contrast to metaphysical conditionals that draw on uncer-
tainty as to how the world is to evolve (which cannot be known yet, at least under a
non-deterministicview; cf. Kaufmann2005). CIs occurnaturallywithbothtypesof
antecedents. The antecedent proposition can be decided (30a), or still open (30b).
(30) a. If the airport shuttle has already left, take the train.
b. If you miss the airport shuttle, take the train.
Moreover, elements of epistemic modality are generally known to impose limits on
outscoping by other quantiﬁers (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou 2003).18 In particu-
lar, epistemic conditionals seem to disallow cataphoric binding into the if-clause
(cf. Zhou 2005): (31a) expresses a general rule and allows for binding, whereas
(31b) checks whether a particular constellation holds at utterance time. The latter
is an instance of an epistemic conditional, and binding is unacceptable. In (32), the
binding contrast is replicated for CIs.
(31) a. If you say nice things about hisi work, you will ﬁnd every professori will-
ing to talk to you.
b. ∗If hei is already here, every senatori will help you.
(32) a. If you want himi to say nice things about your work, treat every professori
with courtesy.
b. If you ﬁnd himi interested in your work, ask every professori to write a
letter of recommendation for you.
c. ∗If hei is already here, give every speakeri his badge.
So it seems that we might expect the CI in (33) to allow for a reading analogous to
the nested construal which was preferred for (29b). But this is not born out. (33)
does not allow for the (in that case rather trivial) reading which says that in case
jaywalking is illegal, according to the law, it is necessary that you do not jaywalk.
(33) If jaywalking is illegal, don’t do it.
Here we ﬁnd an imperative modiﬁed with what usually functionsas an adverb of epistemic possibil-
ity (vielleicht)used forveryguardedadvice. Nevertheless, I donot thinkthat(i) involvesanoperator
of epistemic possibility outscoping an imperative. Thurmair (1989)’s tests of stressing vielleicht or
moving it into clause initial position suggest that it is a modal particle in such cases.
18But see data in Aloni (2001), also Tancredi (2005) for a caveat.
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(cf. Section 4.1.2). Even if (33) does not express that necessity with respect to the
law depends on the antecedent, the preferred reading for (33) can only be obtained
from a nested construal. Compare the two possibilities given in (34):19
(34) a. lw.(∀w′ ∈ O(cgc ⋒ lw.{jaywalking is illegal},g,w))
[you don’t jaywalk in w′]
b. lw.(∀w′ ∈ BelcS(w)∩ jaywalking is illegal)
[(∀w′′ ∈ O(cgc,g,w′))[you don’t jaywalk in w′′]]
A plausible scenario for (33) is the following: it is unknown to the addressee if the
speaker wants her to obey the law; consequently, we ﬁnd two types of worlds w′, w′′
in CGc that differ with respect to what the speaker wants (= g): g(w′) = { you obey
w′’s law }, g(w′′) = { } (meaning, ‘I don’t care about the law’). In such a scenario,
both construals (34a) and (34b) correctly rule out w′′ worlds at which the speaker
does not have the relevant preference.20 But in addition, (34a) rules out w′-worlds
at which jaywalking is not illegal: here, a preference for law-obedience does not
come out as a preference against jaywalking, hence (34a) is false. So, (33) requires
an analysis in terms of a nested construal.
Now, we have to check whether the alternative narrow scope construal ob-
tained from MOP is needed as well. Intuitively, we have good evidence for that
from paradigms like (30). And we can show that the nested construal makes wrong
predictions for a particular type of CIs, namely second best imperatives:
(35) Don’t get lost! But if you do, call me.
A natural scenario for (35) is one where the ordering source g is constituted by
the preference of the speaker. Then, from the ﬁrst imperative we learn that the
speaker wants the addressee not to get lost (that is, (∀w∈CGc) [(lw′.cA doesn’t get
lost in w′) ∈ g(w)]). CGc contains four types of worlds with respect to the future
events of the addressee getting lost (l) and calling (c), namely: w ⊆ {¬l,c}, w
⊆ {¬l,¬c}, w ⊆ {l,c}, w ⊆ {l,¬c}. Each of these types is distinguished further
according to the speaker’s preferences. They differentiate the three possibilities
19It is highly controversial which kind of epistemic modality should be employed in indicative
conditionals; I choose speaker-epistemic modality (instead of e.g. mutual joint belief, the CG-
modality)sothattheymayconveyinformation. This is sometimeschallengedbecausesentenceslike
(29c) are not felt to make claims about what the speaker believes, but rather about what the world
is like. I do not consider this problematic, though. Even if encoded explicitly, speaker epistemic
modality is often treated as ‘invisible’ in discourse:
(i) A: I believe it’s raining.
B: #No, you don’t./No, it’s not.
20Note that in this scenario the speaker does not command perfect knowledge of what he wants:
He knows that he has an overall preference for the hearer to obey the law, but he does not know
what that exactlyamounts to. Among the worlds doxastically accessible to him, we ﬁnd both worlds
where jaywalking is illegal and he has a preference for the hearer to avoid it and worlds where
jaywalking is not illegal and he has no preference for the hearer to avoid it. The requirement of
epistemic authority (cf. 23) has to be weakened to allow for such conditional insecurity over one’s
preferences.
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come out as in (36).
(36) a. lw.(∀w′ ∈ O(cgc ⋒ lw.{you get lost},g,w)) [you call me in w′]
b. lw.(∀w′ ∈ BelcS(w)∩ you get lost) [(∀w′′ ∈ O(cgc,g,w′))[you call me in
w′′]]
This time, (36b) does not make the right predictions, though: the antecedent re-
stricts attention to a subset of the w- and w-worlds in CG (those compatible with
the speaker’s beliefs) and rules out all those worlds wi in CG that do not verify
O(cgc,g,wi) ⊆ you call me. This eliminates w- and w-worlds that are type w′ or
w′′ with respect to preferences. So, (36b) would inform the hearer of an uncondi-
tional preference for calling. In contrast to that, (36a) predicts correctly that we end
up with CGc ⊆ lw.[g(w) ⊆ {¬l,¬l∨c}].21 Consequently, we have good reason to
retain the MOPCI-construal made available by MOP.
At this point we might want to think a bit about the nature of the nested
construals. If epistemic CIs result from embedding under an epistemic modal, it
is highly surprising that imperatives cannot in general be embedded under modal
operators of epistemic necessity. To resolve this puzzle, let’s take a look at a dif-
ferent phenomenon, namely modal subordination. I will argue that imperatives -
like modal verbs - can to a certain extent be subject to modal subordination, and
that the ‘nested’ reading of CIs is to be obtained in a similar fashion (its analysis
thus coming close to certain types of HSA). Consider the German and English data
in (37) and (38).22
(37) Vielleicht
perhaps
bringt
brings
ja
PRT
Maria
Maria
einen
a
Weini
wine
mit.
along.
Dann
then
stell
put.IMP
ihni
it
einstweilen
in-the-meantime
in
in
den
the
K¨ uhlschrank.
fridge
‘Mary might bring some winei with her. In that case, put iti in the fridge in
the meantime.’
21A nested modality analysis could produce that effect by copying the restriction of the epistemic
modal provided by the if-clause into the restrictor of the embedded modal, OPImp, as well. (E.g.
alongthelinesofFrank1996,whodeniesthatnon-epistemicmodalscaneverfunctionasconditional
operators.) I do not see muchmotivationfor such a move though. We cannotreally arguein terms of
uniformity: the two construals are set apart by the copying mechanism, which in addition seems ad
hoc. Moreover, I do not think that the binding contrast (cf. 32) could be predicted from interaction
with the copying mechanism.
22It mightlooksuspiciousthatthepresenceofananaphoricelement(dann/inthatcase)is strongly
preferredbut this seems to constitute a generalpreferenceto be observedwith non-epistemicmodals
(cf. i,ii). In contrast to that, epistemic modals do not require anaphoric elements (cf. iii).
(i) Mary might buy a lottery ticketi. Bill is such a careful guy, #he should keep iti.
(ii) Mary might buy a lottery ticketi. In that case, since Bill is such a careful guy, he should keep
iti.
(iii) You should buy a lottery ticketi. You are such a lucky guy, iti might be worth millions.
254 Magdalena Schwager(38) Ede might make lasagnei tonight. ???/ok(In that case) try iti, he’s an excellent
cook.
The proposal for CIs is thus to use OPImp as the modal operator whenever the
parameters with respect to which it is evaluated (the preferences) are independent
of the antecedent. But for the other cases (that is, the epistemic ones), instead
of a nested construal of modalities, I would like to propose that imperatives can
sometimesgetevaluatedonasubsetoftheCommonGround. Thesubsetinquestion
might be determined by an if-clause or by a preceding clause expressing epistemic
possibility (thus picking out a subset of CG).
The remainder of the paper gives a rough sketch of imperatives as evaluated
with respect to subsets of the Common Ground.
5.2. Imperatives f! with Discourse Referents for Backgrounds
So far, we have treated all conditionals as forming a single proposition. In order to
capture the similarity to the modal subordination data, I will now assume that an
alternativeconstrualﬁrstintroducesaset ofworldstobeconsidered(apropositional
discourse referent), and then evaluates the imperative with respect to that set of
worlds. Crucially, the requirement that the imperative always takes the Common
Ground as a background is loosened to the requirement that its background be a
subset of the Common Ground.
To spell this out, I resort to DRT with propositional discourse referents and
discourse referents for ordering sources along the lines of Geurts (1999). Here,
modal operators are generally assumed to presuppose a background b (an indexed
proposition, which is a set of pairs <world,assignment>), and an ordering source
g (as before, a world dependent set of propositions), and relate them to another
propositional discourse referent. Now, the requirements spelt out in Section 4.1.2
are translated as restrictions on the presuppositional discourse referents b and g.23
So, b has to be a subset of the Common Ground (b ⊆ CG), g has to be preference-
related (pref-rel(g)) and afﬁrmed by the speaker (aff(cS,g)), and the speaker has
to count as an authority on g (∈ AUTH(cS)). The DRS built from an imperative
(you) P! can now be given as in (39). The discourse referents for background b and
ordering source g have to be anchored to suitable elements salient in the discourse,
and a new referent q is introduced for the worlds in the background at which the
addressee satisﬁes the imperative.
(39) [b, q,g: q=b+[: P(cA)], OPT(b,g) q, b⊆CG,pref-rel(g), g∈AUTH(cS)]
Atleastafterutteringtheif-clause,adiscoursereferent p thatveriﬁestheantecedent
is salient and accessible. If it is a subsetof the CommonGround, b (theimperative’s
background) can be set to p. Necessity of the consequent is asserted only with
23I follow Geurts (1999) in underlining presuppositional discourse referents: they are either an-
chored to a previously introduced, accessible discourse referent or, if they possess enough descrip-
tive content, can be accommodated.
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as follows:24
(40) g-optimal worlds: [[ OPT(p,g) ]] w, f  =
{ w′,g  ∈ f(p) | ¬(∃ w′′,h  ∈ f(p)) [w′′ ≤ f(g)(w)w′ & w′  ≤ f(g)(w)w′′]}
A nice, independent prediction is obtained if we assume that counterfactual condi-
tionals arise from making salient a propositional discourse referent p which is not
a subset of CG, and interpreting the consequent with respect to p. Since impera-
tives have been required to be evaluated with respect to a subset of CG, it falls out
immediately that counterfactual conditionals constitute impossible antecedents for
imperatives.
(41) ∗If your mother were stricter, brush your teeth more often!
Likewise, negation can sometimes render salient its (positive) complement propo-
sition, enabling sequences like (42a), cf. Geurts (1999). But again, the respective
discourse referent is not part of the CG anymore when it comes to evaluating the
second sentence. Consequently, an imperative as in (42b) is ruled out correctly.
(42) a. I don’t have a microwave oven. I wouldn’t know what to do with it.
b. I don’t have a microwave oven. #Don’t use it!
6. Conclusion
Imperatives have been shown to occur freely in all types of conditionals; in particu-
lar, the consequent of hypothetical conditionals can take the form of an imperative.
Imperatives in conditionals show similar effects as overt modal verbs do. I take
this to constitute additional evidence for the independently motivated hypothesis
that imperatives contain modal operators. The standard construal of if-clauses con-
straining the restrictor of some (overt) modal operator carries over to CIs.
Imperatives have been shown to occur in epistemic conditionals, and, some-
what surprisingly, it has been argued that we can ﬁnd instances of modal subordina-
tion with imperatives. These two issues have been taken together in order to argue
that, as long as this is explicitly indicated, imperatives can sometimes be evaluated
on a proper subset of the Common Ground. This ﬁts well with the fact that CIs are
never counterfactual.
The possibility to evaluate imperatives on a subset of CG gets us closer to
the hypothetical speach act analysis (HSA) than initially expected. But the modal
operator analysis (MOP) captures this not as an ad hoc-solution for CIs but in com-
plete analogy to (i) evaluating unrestricted imperatives on the unrestricted CG or
(ii) evaluating imperatives with respect to subsets of CG made salient in some other
24As it stands, thetreatmentoftheorderingsourceis unsatisfactorysinceit is notpartoftheobject
(DRT-)language but happens in the model (cf. Frank 1996, Geurts 1999). Moreover, to translate the
MOPCI-construal for conditionals (cf. 24), we need a slightly more complex variant of OPT.
256 Magdalena Schwagerway (e.g. via modal subordination). Moreover, I have given evidence that the al-
ternative construal of treating the imperative as the conditional operator (obtained
exclusively from MOP) is needed as well (to account for overall preferences, bind-
ing contrasts, and maybe anankastic conditionals).
Technically, the analysis in terms of discourse referents for the parameters
of modal operators has been sketched in a DRT language. So far, the treatment of
ordering sources is not satisfactory though. Further insights into the nature of CIs
may also be gained from detailed comparison with if-clauses in connection with
interrogatives (cf. e.g. Isaacs 2005) and explicit performatives.
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